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In a Man’s words 
– the politics of female representation in the public
Abstract
What one decides fi t for appearance through writing and speech bears a political signifi cance that risk being 
distorted through both language, reception in the public, and through calls for gendered representations. How 
can work of female philosophers be interpreted as a concern for the world from that of having to respond to a 
male-dominated discourse through which speech becomes trapped into what one might represent as ‘other’? 
In this paper, I explore the public reception of two female thinkers who question, in diff erent ways, the domi-
nant notion of the author or philosopher as a male subject; what kind of limitations does the relative notion 
of ‘female’ pose political action, and how can privilege constitute a hindrance to feminist solidarity?
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”Hannah Arendt:
– It is entirely possible that a woman will one day be a philosopher.... 
Male interviewer:
– I consider you to be a philosopher…
Hannah Arendt:
– Well, I can’t help that, but in my opinion I am not. In my opinion I have said good-bye to 
philosophy once and for all.”1
Introduction – the philosopher
Th e underrepresentation of female philosophers has been researched through diff erent 
lenses that attempt to describe the dissonance that ‘female’ pose within a male-centred 
discourse.2 Challenging the notion of student as male in classical works such as Rousseau’s 
1 Hannah Arendt, “‘What Remains? Th e Language Remains’: A Conversation with Günter Gaus,” in Essays in Under-
standing, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), 2.
2 Vera Tripoli, “Intuition, Gender and the under-Representation of Women in Philosophy,” Rivista Di Estetica 58 
(2015): 136-46. doi.org/10.4000/estetica.439.
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Émile or On Education3 (in which Sophie is reduced to a future partner for Émile) Mary 
Wollstonecraft responded in 1792 with a call for women’s rights through her decisive work 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman4 in which she opposes Rousseau’s proposal of a girl’s 
education. “Not only was she (Wollstonecraft) female and so likely to notice Sophie – as 
generations of male commentators have not – but also, she was herself far from fi tting 
Rousseau’s ideal of a submissive”5 woman, as she was a best-selling author and intellectual. 
Wollstonecraft’s edutopia for women in society, developed in recent work in philosophy of 
education6 raise questions concerning what kind of educational relationships that enable 
social justice and gender equality.
Regardless of present day eff orts toward such calls in academia, the continuous pro-
blem of female students dropping out at introductory levels in philosophy studies has been 
raised and critically discussed in terms of feelings of ‘belonging’, ‘comfort’, and ‘confi dence’ 
in the philosophy classroom7. 
“Entrance into intellectual discussions is a hard-won battle for women” according to 
feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray, who explained her refusal of sharing personal details 
in an interview 1993, stating that “reference to biographical material is one way in which 
women’s credibility is challenged”.8 She has throughout her work exposed the male-gende-
red language traditionally used in philosophy. As ‘female’ in higher education reading philo-
sophical work, one might react to the (excluding) use of the noun ‘him’ and ‘his’ in classical 
work, and to the individual generally being referred to as ‘he’ and how ‘man’ or ‘men’ are 
supposed to be inclusive of ‘everyone’. 
From this, I initially wanted to scrutinize through feminist thinkers such as Irigaray, the 
belief that being ‘othered’ leads to a rejection of the self that then might be imbedded in 
one’s writing. One way to explore this would be through the notion of schizophrenia as a 
metaphor for the ways in which the ‘female’ subject may struggle to express herself wit-
hout simultaneously inhabiting the public reception, carrying the critic within. Th is initial 
interest evolved into a more political concern – of identity, representation, and the pos-
sibility for political action – of female representation in a man’s words.9
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education (USA: Basic Books, 1979). 
4 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Boston: Peter Edes, 1792).
5 Morwenna Griffi  ths, “Educational Relationships: Rousseau, Wollstonecraft and Social Justice,” Journal of Philoso-
phy of Education 48, no. 2 (2014): 341. doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12068.
6 Griffi  ths, “Educational Relationships: Rousseau, Wollstonecraft and Social Justice”; Rebecca Adami and Claudia 
Schumann, “Feminism and Philosophy of Education,” in Philosophy: Education, ed. Bryan Warnick and Lynda Stone, 
Philosophy Series (Farmington Hills: Macmillan, 2017).
7 Morgan Th ompson et al., “Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level,” 
Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (2016).
8 “Luce Irigaray”, by Sarah K. Donovan, Th e Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, http://www.iep.utm.
edu/irigaray/.
9 In a man’s words is a paraphrasing of James Brown song “It’s a man’s world”. In an interview on CNN from 1988 
when he has just been bailed from alleged abuse of his wife he does not answer any of the female interviewer’s que-
stions regarding the assault. He instead continues talking about his new album, his latest hit. Tuning (apparently 
stoned) on the lyrics “it’s a man’s world”, these words receive a rather diff erent connotation in a situation of a man 
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Th ere is an inherent paradox in this exploration, that of naming the ‘otherness’ I seek 
to problematize. Th en, is it only the privilege of a few not to be concerned with ‘otherness’, 
hence of not naming that which is nonetheless felt by unjust social practices? Battling with 
this tension between gendering as acknowledging, and of acknowledging a work in its own 
right, without the author having to be a representative of diff erence, I build on Hannah 
Arendt’s notion of political action precisely for her defi ance of identity politics. 
In the paper, I aim at problematizing the limitations that calls for representations place 
on women in academia while being ‘othered’, and how this ‘othering’ risk distancing one 
from identifying as ‘woman’ when asked to respond to ’women issues’. I will do this through 
a critical interpretation of interview extracts with two philosophers, an analysis building on 
the notion of aff ective dissonance that according to Clare Hemmings10 may lead to engage-
ment with, or rejection of, feminist theory. 
We might decide that questions of gender are not relevant in any given task of writing 
and speech, but the signifi cance of representation often seem to be in the interpreter’s 
gaze, in the readers’ interest, or in the audience that listen. Th e infl uence of Hannah Arendt 
and Simone de Beauvoir, through their respective work on the conditions of political action 
and freedom, continues to inspire contemporary philosophical perspectives, although they 
themselves rejected the label of ‘philosopher’ in order to place greater emphasis on the 
political dimensions of the writing, and for Beauvoir on the literal. “Deferring the position 
of ‘the philosopher’ to Sartre, Beauvoir explicitly claims she is a literary author.”11
 Whereas Arendt has been criticised by contemporary feminist thinkers for ignoring 
‘women issues’ in her work, Beauvoir places the specifi c conditions of the ‘other’ sex at the 
centre for such a theoretical investigation. When interviewed about their work, however, 
it is not their concern for the world that is placed in the foreground initially by the male 
interviewers, but them as representatives of female emancipation. 
Th e problem I seek to address is the double-edged sword of acknowledging political 
speech, work, and deeds of women while simultaneously forcing women to represent 
‘femininity’ and an identity as ‘woman’.
You say philosophy is generally considered a masculine occupation
For Hannah Arendt, appearance and the public are interrelated; the passions of the heart, 
the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses need to be transformed, de-privati-
apparently refusing to respond of violence against women – and getting away with it. (James Brown was released 
immediately as the charges were dropped, and “released” from further questions on the subject as the interviewer 
follows up, “all women love you, why do you think that is?” hence not having to respond to allegedly assaulting his 
wife with a lead pipe and fi ring a gun at a car she was in).
10 Clare Hemmings, “Aff ective Solidarity: Feminist Refl exivity and Political Transformation,” Feminist Th eory 13, no. 2 
(2012): 147-61. doi.org/10.1177/1464700112442643.
11 Nathalie Nya, “Th e Question of Infl uence: Sartre and Beauvoir”, Journal of Literature and Art Studies 6, no. 11 
(n.d.): 1304. doi.org/10.17265/2159-5836/2016.11.005.
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zed, de-individualized into a shape that fi ts these experiences for public appearance; and 
the most current of such transformations (of desire, thoughts and pleasure), according to 
Arendt, occurs through storytelling and artistic expression that transpose individual expe-
riences.12
Th e relational quality of political acts restricts the political signifi cance, weight and 
force of some people’s narratives. To ‘act’, in the etymology of the word from Greek and 
Latin, according to Arendt, “contains two interrelated words”: to begin and to bear. “Here it 
seems as though each action were divided into two parts, the beginning made by a single 
person and the achievement in which many join by ‘bearing’ and ‘fi nishing’ the enterprise, 
by seeing it through.”13
How some narratives are received and viewed as more trustworthy, or regarded as 
more objective and given more epistemic weight as evidence in research (and politics) is in 
my view a continuous struggle of power and voice. I have elsewhere explored the critique 
in legal theory of the use of narratives in courts dealing with human rights claims,14 where 
testimonies of women and children (for diff erent reasons) have historically and traditio-
nally been given less weight as ‘evidence’ to actually infl uence historical accounts, and the 
application of law. For Arendt law is a necessary precondition to politics, and her concern 
is for equal participation in both, hence her conceptualization of politics focus the process, 
and not the outcome of such actions.15
In my reading, the legitimacy and political weight of narratives are disclosed by their 
reception in the public. As Arendt states: “Th e disclosure of the ‘who’ through speech, and 
the setting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where 
their immediate consequences can be felt.”16 Th e agent tends to be disclosed together with 
the act, and action only appears in its full glory in the public.17 A life lived only in the public, 
according to Arendt, becomes “rather shallow”, and hence the hiding place of the private 
is a condition for a deep commitment in the public, to have a space where thoughts can 
be developed through privacy. “Privacy was like the other, the dark and hidden side of the 
public realm, and while to be political meant to attain the highest possibility of human exi-
stence, to have no private place of one’s own (like a slave) meant to be no longer human.”18 
Arendt’s distinction between public and private has been levelled against her as not being 
fruitful for feminist claims for rights and justice – as closely connected to the private. 
12  Hannah Arendt, Th e Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 50.
13 Arendt, 189.
14 Adami, “Th e Critical Potential of Using Counter Narratives in Human Rights Education,” in Critical Human Rights, 
Citizenship, and Democracy Education: Entanglements and Regenerations, ed. Michalinos Zembylas and André 
Keet (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).
15 Jerome Kohn, “Taking Politics Seriously,” Harvard Law Review 119, no. 2 (n.d.): 639-45.
16 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 184.
17 Arendt, 180.
18 Arendt, 64.
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Instead of seeing the division of private and public as a reason for not engaging with 
Arendt in feminist theory, Bonnie Honig19 argues that this distinction off ers a possibility 
to develop an agonistic and performative politics through which to augment and amend 
what is deemed to be politics. Since Arendt, according to Honig, opposed “attempts to 
conceive of politics as expressive of shared (community) identities such as gender, race, eth-
nicity, or nationality”,20 her political account provides an opportunity to develop a feminist 
politics not built on shared identity, but on constant negotiation of what feminist politics 
and identity could entail – when not viewed as essentializing. 
Honig proposes that agonistic politics creates new relations, in both the public and the 
private realm. In my reading of Arendt, the web of relations is in the public, so in a generous 
reading we can see that politics in the public can amend relations in the private realm – for 
example through new legislation on rights in the private realm – but political contestations 
occur, in my reading of Arendt, only in the public.
I appreciate Honig’s development of agonistic politics, while not sharing her reading 
that in order to pursue agonistic politics we need to resist the public/private distinction. 
What we need to resist is rather any argument that issues traditionally confi ned to the pri-
vate realm could not become political when voiced and received in the public.21
Mary G. Dietz summarizes the feminist critique of Arendt’s private/public distinction in 
Feminist Receptions of Hannah Arendt, stating that “Even those feminists who do not share 
the analytical presuppositions of diff erence feminism often fi nd it necessary to acknow-
ledge that Arendt’s distinction of public/private is ‘historically invidious’, ‘astounding’ in 
its ‘denial of the women’s issue’, or at least inappropriately viewed as a ‘preferred state of 
aff airs.’”22 Arendt is in this sense read as placing ‘woman’ in the non-political private realm, 
hence ignoring the political relevance of ‘women issues’, and in addition reifying this divi-
sion so as to keep ‘women’ in the private realm.   
According to Dietz, it is rather by re-discovering how Arendt genders bodily work in 
relation to producing work that allows us to explore her concept of action as a space to re-
claim issues that have traditionally not been regarded as of political weight. In my reading 
of Arendt, she explores the human condition in relation to three distinctions of activities: 
bodily labour, manufacture and action, without gendering the private/public distinction, 
19 Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, Re-Reading the Canon, 99-2088461-8 (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylva-
nia State Univ. Press, 1995). doi.org/10.2307/2082622.
20 Honig, 149.
21 Th e haschtag #metoo is a current example of how what has been silenced in the private realm (such as sexual 
abuse) when voiced in the public were given a political weight that demands political action. In my understanding, 
there is no contradiction between political recognition of ‘women issues’ in the public and Arendt’s distinction. 
When second-generation feminists claimed that the private realm is political, this is exactly what they did – in my 
interpretation: they voiced what had been labelled ‘women issues’ in the public, thus negotiating what had been 
legislated and not, through politics.  
22 Mary G. Dietz, “Feminist Receptions of Hannah Arendt,” in Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 29.
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hence such a distinction does not have to be seen “as a key to problems of exclusion and to 
the historical condition of women in particular.”23
Arendt problematizes the conditions for action through a historical lens on how action 
has been related to property owning, to the head of household, and to those who, by 
privilege, are freed from labour. Th rough this kind of historicizing, Arendt (re-)introduces 
the concept of political action, that “philosophers had failed to place at the center stage”24 
of politics. By doing so, Arendt explores the conditions, rather than the ends of political 
action, as based on plurality and equality. 
If we read Arendt’s distinction of human activities purely as a description of a human 
condition (that she traces throughout history) without any normative judgement for a 
‘preferred political theory’ we may appreciate how she is observing and describing, rather 
than proposing preferred conditions for political action. In my reading, Arendt’s descrip-
tion does not reject arguments that issues related to oppression and power in the private 
realm can become political concerns in the public. Nonetheless, Arendt’s division implies 
that such forms of oppression will gain political weight when voiced in the public. In my 
interpretation of her political theory, Arendt does not exclude ‘women’ from the political 
realm since, for one thing, she opposes static labels such as ‘woman’, and additionally does 
not defi ne the public as a ‘male’ domain.
Arendt’s presumed silence in relation to explicitly mentioning gender can be read as 
excluding ‘women issues’ from a concept of politics, or as challenging the reifi cation of 
such exclusion by defying to name the discriminatory structure of the public as historically 
dominated by white men from privileged backgrounds. 
Je n’ai jamais souff ert25
Simone de Beauvoir acknowledges in Th e Second Sex the social, economic and cultural 
conditions that limit female emancipation. Woman, according to Beauvoir, is the category 
of ‘other’ – that constitutes the subject as male. Her work has been read as feminist existen-
tialism due to her description of the conditions that limit women’s exercise of individual 
freedom.
I fi nd a similarity in Beauvoir’s distinction between transcendence and immanence with 
Arendt’s public/private distinction. However, in Beauvoir’s writing, the gendered analysis 
is what builds this distinction, whereas in Arendt’s writing, the distinction of public/pri-
vate is a way to examine the conditions for political action. Th e distinction between tran-
scendence and immanence allows us to see how men have been privileged by expressing 
transcendence through projects, whereas women have been forced into a repetitive and 
uncreative life of immanence. Evidently, in contrast to Arendt, Beauvoir described the con-
23 Dietz, 29.
24 Kohn, “Taking Politics Seriously,” 640.
25 Beauvoir’s words, in English: ‘I never suff ered’.
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ditions that create sexual diff erence and limit women’s individual freedom as obstacles to 
economic independence. 
It could be assumed that Beauvoir wrote Th e Second Sex based on the basis of her own 
experiences as a woman; however, in an interview in 1959 with her it becomes clear that 
her work was not based solely on her own experiences; rather the contrary, she says. 
In the following I will discuss extracts from interviews with Arendt and Beauvoir, noting 
how both male interviewers, with the questions they pose, in a sense force Arendt and 
Beauvoir to represent, or deny their female sex, when presenting them as exceptions, as 
being female thinkers. 
“Interviewer:
– Do you think a woman can make as through a commitment as a man to a work of 
artistic or ideological creation?
Beauvoir:
– Of course. 
– You may be the exception, but do you think in general, it is as easy for a woman? Is it just 
as possible?
– It depends. If a woman has a true vocation, a real desire to write or sculpt, like the late 
Germaine Richer, or to paint, she will do it as well as a man. 
– Th e portrait you have painted of the feminine condition is not quite so rosy for women. 
Have you suff ered from being a woman?
– Never, as I explain in my memoirs. Th at is why people were mistaken if they took Th e 
Second Sex to be militant. I didn’t even touch upon the issue until, from speaking to other 
women, I learned of their experiences and realized there was a particularly feminine misfor-
tune. But I didn’t personally suff er as I studied what I wanted, without diffi  culty, and I never 
met with hostility among my colleagues, since left-wing intellectuals are the most open and 
liberal with regard to relations between men and women. I never suff ered.”26 
Th e writing of Th e Second Sex – the most infl uential book on feminism – was initially, accor-
ding to Beauvoir, a theoretical investigation based on the description of other women’s 
experiences. Th e interviewer reifi es the image of her as an exception, and not like other 
women: “You may be the exception” he says, but can other women make a living of art or 
writing, that is the question. Beauvoir, being recognized in the public as a thinker, is asked 
by the male interviewer to represent “women” but at the same time to deny her sex, as an 
exception to other “women”.
26 Interview with Simone de Beauvoir, 1959, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFRTl_9CbFU, accessed 13 Novem-
ber 2017, 16:00-17:17. 
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I am afraid I have to protest
Although Arendt’s political theory is not in any way related to female emancipation, 
extracts from an interview in 1964 demonstrates how these issues nonetheless infl uenced 
how she was perceived in the public as a result of the questions posed about female eman-
cipation, on being a “female” philosopher, and of philosophy being a “masculine” occupa-
tion. In the interview, Arendt receives the fi rst question regarding her sex. 
“Male interviewer:
– Hannah Arendt, you are the fi rst lady to be portrayed in this series. Th e fi rst lady with a 
profession some might regard as a masculine one. You are a philosopher.  Please allow me 
to place my fi rst question. In spite of the recognition and respect you have received, do you 
see your role among philosophers as unusual or peculiar because you are a woman?
Hannah Arendt:
– I am afraid I have to protest. I do not belong to the circle of philosophers. My profession, 
if one can even speak of it at all, is political theory. I neither feel like a philosopher, nor do I 
believe that I have been accepted in the circle of philosophers, as you so kindly suppose. But 
to speak of the other question that you raised in your opening remarks: you say philosophy 
is generally thought to be a masculine occupation. It does not have to remain a masculine 
occupation! It is entirely possible that a woman will one day be a philosopher…” 
– I consider you to be a philosopher…
– Well, I can’t help that, but in my opinion I am not. In my opinion I have said good-bye to 
philosophy once and for all. As you know, I studied philosophy, but that does not mean that 
I stayed with it.”27
Instead of defending her work, Arendt has to respond to questions about being a woman 
and a philosopher. Arendt is asked here to respond to identity politics, a response that 
few white, western, heteronormative men are asked to make. However, if one is in any way 
‘othered’, one will most probably have had to respond to the question of representation of 
‘otherness’ before discussing one’s work, contribution, or literary expression. 
Arendt questions a call for representation of ‘otherness’ in the interview. She declares, 
fi rst of all, that she does not defi ne herself as a philosopher; she is a political theoretician. 
Secondly, being a philosopher, because at that point it is seen as a male profession, does not 
mean that a woman will not be a philosopher in the future. (She also questions defi ning 
philosophy and political thinking as a profession – for her this is vitae active). Th e intervie-
wer persists: “I consider you to be a philosopher”. “I can’t help that”, responds Arendt. 
Both Arendt’s and Beauvoir’s denial that they share a “female experience”, combined 
with the male interviewer’s insistence on defi ning them as “female” while at the same time 
identifying them as “exceptions” to other women reifi es both the ‘philosopher’ or ‘writer’ 
as male and them as rare exceptions. 
27 Arendt, “‘What Remains? Th e Language Remains’: A Conversation with Günter Gaus,” 1-2.
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Representations of ‘otherness’ may be inhibiting, through notions of suff ering, and there 
might be a need to relationally create a discursive space for an already emancipated, already 
voiced ‘female’ subject in the public, a political position taken through a strong articulated 
sense of self that both Arendt and Beauvoir seem to speak from, but which they take on, 
not based on a shared ‘female’ experience.
“Male interviewer:
– Now, let us turn to the question of woman’s emancipation. Has this been a problem for 
you?
Arendt:
– Yes, of course; there is always the problem as such. (…)  Th e problem itself played no role 
for me personally. To put it very simply, I have always done what I liked to do.”28
In the interview, Arendt acknowledges the problem of female emancipation while saying 
that she herself did not relate to the problem in decisions of what she wanted to pursue. 
She seems reluctant here to defi ne herself as ‘woman’ or to discuss separatist women’s 
movements. Th e impossibility for ‘female’ philosophers to ignore identity politics in the 
public reception of their work is a paradox of political action – she decides what is fi t for 
appearance, but is nonetheless received as gendered. 
Arendt recognises in Th e Human Condition29 that action through speech, as distinguis-
hed from manufacture, tends to disclose the subject, while at the same time limiting the 
possibilities of that disclosure since it is through a web of relations that our actions are 
received and where our selves are exposed. 
“Th e moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into 
saying what he is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with 
others like him; we begin to describe a type or a ‘character’ in the old meaning of the word, 
with the result that his specifi c uniqueness escapes us.”30
Even in this quote from Arendt, the vocabulary is gendered, which may lead (feminist) 
receptions of the writing astray. Th e impossibility for female writers of not mentioning 
what is implicitly there? In my reading, exposing ourselves through words demands grea-
ter courage of women (especially marginalised women) as the interpretation of words is 
dependent on a validation of narratives that risk creating a sense of homelessness of ‘the 
other’ in the public, or a demand to represent ‘diff erence’ as a collective identity trait.31
28 Arendt, “‘What Remains? Th e Language Remains’: A Conversation with Günter Gaus,” 2-3.
29 Arendt, Th e Human Condition.
30 Arendt, 181.
31 See further Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, the Life of a Jewess (Baltimore and London: Th e John Hopkins 
University Press, 1997). Rebecca Adami, “Paideia and Cosmopolitan Education: On Subjectifi cation, Politics and 
Justice,” Studier i Paedagogisk Fiosofi  4, no. 2 (2015): 68-80 doi.org/10.7146/spf.v4i2.22419 ; Rebecca Adami, “Human 
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I try to describe it
In Th e Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir succeeds where phenomenologist had failed, argues 
Margery Simons,32 in defi ning a political philosophy as she “locates her critique on the mar-
gins of culture” by “privileging female voices.”33 Beauvoir describes a gendered structure 
that keeps women from leading a political life, which is addressed in the following extracts 
from the interview as ‘a feminist revolt’. Th is interpretation stresses the feminist political 
discourse her work generated, but without acknowledging how Beauvoir extends existen-
tial phenomenology through the originality of her subject – that of describing a feminine 
condition.
“Male interviewer:
– In Th e Second Sex, you revolt against the current feminine condition?
De Beauvoir:
– I don’t exactly revolt, I think…
– You protest…
– Yes, but it is not even really a protest, I try to describe it. Because I think it is good to 
become aware of what is. I think a protest would be in vain, since currently, neither men nor 
women can just transform things with a magic wand. Women’s issues are tied to matters of 
work, the workforce and unemployment, and by extension, to needs, scarcity, and wealth, 
etc.”34
When describing the female condition, however, Beauvoir became more ‘militant’ as she 
received endless letters from women who had read her work and who shared their indi-
vidual experiences of this condition. Th rough the French Mouvement de Liberation des 
Femmes (MLF) Beauvoir pushed later for a law on sexism to be recognised as discrimina-
tion against women, and for abortion rights in France. 
How is it that one of our most well-known western feminists did not initially identify 
herself as being part of a feminist revolt against patriarchal structures? Beauvoir’s descrip-
tion of the condition of women in Th e Second Sex gives us an opportunity to explore the 
structures that prevent women from taking on ‘women’s issues’ and from identifying as 
‘feminist’.
In order to problematize the reception of Arendt’s and Beauvoir’s work, and themselves 
as “women” in male-dominated philosophy, I will in the following employ a critical reading 
of their stance through the notion of class privilege, exploring resistances to feminist theory 
Rights For More Th an One Voice: Re-Th inking Political Space Beyond the Local/Global Divide.,” Ethics & Global 
Politics 7, no. 4 (2014): 163-80 doi.org/10.3402/egp.v7.24454 .
32 Simons, Beauvoir and the Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism.
33 Simons, 103.
34 Interview with Simone de Beauvoir 1959, accessed 13 November 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=SFRTl_9CbFU 14:00-15:00. 
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and of identifying as feminist, with the concept of aff ective dissonance, explored by the 
postmodern contemporary thinker Clare Hemmings.
Th e dissonance between my sense of self 
and the possibilities for its expression 
When encountering feminist theory, Clare Hemmings found herself opposed to the very 
idea that she was oppressed because of her sex; hence she refused initially to engage herself 
as a feminist. “I was a strong, self-reliant intellectual, equal to any boy or man and would 
not be told that my chances in life were any less that theirs.”35 Since feminist theory tells us 
that there are structures that limit people’s possibilities due to gender – for women from a 
privileged class- and racial background, those experiences of oppression may not be felt as 
immediate – this may create opposition to identifi cation with feminism. 
When one’s experiences, due to privilege blindness, do not immediately confi rm 
descriptions of unequal conditions (for example sex), feminist theory becomes the immedi-
ate image of stating one’s inferiority. As Hemmings elicits, “I simply would not accept there 
was something that needed changing, and my rage at the very thought found feminism 
as an object, since the social world could not be its object.”36 It is through these feelings of 
anger, that acknowledging inequality stems, through which acts of feminist solidarity can 
spring. With the notions of aff ective dissonance and aff ective solidarity Hemmings explores 
the dissonance and the feelings of rage and irritation that feminism may arouse. Th ese 
feelings of dissonance are what might create a spark that can lead to a re-evaluation of 
one’s ontological standpoint. 
In the interview with Simone de Beauvoir, she was asked if Th e Second Sex is a revolt 
against patriarchal structures. She said: “No, it is a description of a condition I became 
aware of after having listened to other women’s stories of oppression”. As she stated later 
in the interview, “people are mistaken if they read Th e Second Sex as feminist militant”; it 
did not arise from any personal struggle, it developed as a theoretical investigation into the 
situation of women who lived diff erent lives than herself. As an intellectual at the presti-
gious University of Paris, and with a bourgeois background, Beauvoir did not maintain a life 
of necessity, labouring in the private realm, but led what Arendt describes as vita activa. 
Th is privileged academic position (historically granted exclusively to men) risked placing 
the call to solidarity with feminism as merely a burden of ‘female’ representation – hers was 
initially a theoretical investigation, not a feminist revolt. 
Th ere is a large section of contemporary feminist theory that builds on the notion of 
‘empathy’ as a premise for ethical and moral responsibility across diff erence. Th is notion 
has connotations of the asymmetric power relations of privileged people’s call for empathy 
with the marginalised. As privilege may leave us rather unempathetic with others, Hem-
35 Hemmings, “Aff ective Solidarity: Feminist Refl exivity and Political Transformation,” 150.
36 Hemmings, 150.
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mings wants to move away from empathy and instead build on notions of solidarity that 
may stem from a range of feelings that disrupts one’s perception that the conditions of 
society enable equity. She wants to explore the possibility that rage and frustration open in 
the confrontation of feminist theory with our view of the world and the social conditions 
in it. 
For someone whose freedom and possibilities have not (seemingly) been immediately 
aff ected by gender, feminist critique may arise images of ‘aggressiveness’ to be rejected in 
order to rather stay ignorant of those who are not privileged enough to be able to resist 
the social pressure of subordination. In the words of Hemmings: “My indignation (…) 
arose precisely because I did not see a diff erence between ontological and epistemological 
possibilities.”37 
In my reading, the aff ective dissonance that engaging with feminist critique may arise 
can be the very reason for someone identifying primarily as a ‘philosopher’ or ‘political the-
orist’ to defy such explanations. As theories that address inequality and injustice risk arising 
feelings of discomfort, rage, and guilt – that may lead to solidarity – these threaten the very 
notion of the traditional Cartesian philosopher or researcher (as objective, value-free, and 
un-aff ected by the conditions he is ‘discovering’ – rather than producing). It is hence when 
we acknowledge academia as a site of knowledge production that the privilege of staying 
gender-blind becomes a choice of resisting calls for solidarity by keeping epistemological 
assumptions intact. Th e aff ective distance that theoretical investigations of the conditions 
of politics may seem to demand, can nevertheless reveal gendered inequalities, or propose 
utopian conceptualizations from which political action can spur.
According to Hemmings, rage can, but does not have to, lead to solidarity. Th ere needs 
to be some kind of aff ective dissonance for the politics of solidarity to emerge. In her own 
experience, “rage here marked me as marvellously privileged in class and race terms, as 
well as fortunate in my family support, and remarkably un-empathetic in my orientations 
towards others.”38 What had caused this rage? Hemmings describes how she became aware 
of a dissonance between her sense of self – as free, equal, and with the same opportunities 
in life as men – and the world as an eff ect of her aff ective response, fi rst when confronting 
feminist theory and then when confronting her world view with these new lenses. How 
we view the world and ourselves in it, our ontological premises, is according to Hemmings, 
closer to our epistemic premises, what we hold as knowledge, since in a certain way, they 
premise each other. 
Th e dissonance between her sense of self and the felt rage she felt led to a de-natu-
ralization of her view of the world, from a harmonious to a critical relationship. Aff ective 
dissonance resulted for Hemmings in a feminist identity, but it can also result in a rejec-
tion of feminism – a rejection of new epistemological assumptions in order to keep onto-
logical premises intact.  Building on Hemmings distinction between ‘womanhood’ and 
37 Hemmings, 150.
38 Hemmings, 150.
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‘feminism’ as critical for understanding “what motivates gendered change”39 there is also a 
profound diff erence between on the one hand calls to represent ‘womanhood’ and on the 
other being received as a ‘woman’ through words that may reinforce or question prejudice 
against women.
Concluding discussion – When will it concern us?
“When she fi nally said something, it either led to the conversation dying out and being repla-
ced by an uncanny silence, or that the writers, probably in order to demonstrate how inde-
pendent and sophisticated they were, did not take any notice of what she said but simply 
continued talking.”40 
I have been concerned here with the reception of speech and written work as political 
action in the public. Leading a political life (vita activa) means, amongst other things, to 
lead a public life, which demands courage to expose oneself through the spoken and writ-
ten. Th e narrator, speaker or author cannot determine the response her or his words and 
actions will provoke. 
When a prominent woman is presented in the public as ‘an exception’, and also, in 
contrast when she is presented as ‘representing all women’, the political signifi cance of ‘her’ 
words and ‘her’ deeds becomes either a questioning of female political agency or a reduc-
tion of women’s voice to ‘one’. 
By responding to a male-gendered public, ‘woman’ runs the risk of representing a social 
category which has been defi ned in prejudiced terms, or to defy such identifi cation, which 
may lead to an alienation of her sex, as ‘other’. Reluctance towards, or avoidance of, feminist 
critique as “bringing in gender” disregards how both language and the public reception of 
words and deeds may already be gendered. Walking into a room with portraits of former 
male presidents on the walls is walking into a highly-gendered room. History has already 
been re-told through gendered male lenses (history). Acknowledging this is not bringing 
gender into the scene; it is making explicit discriminatory practices of silencing ‘the other’ 
in dominating discourses of history, philosophy, and politics. 
Arendt’s description of the conditions for leading a political life when read together 
with Beauvoir’s description of the gendered conditions that prevent women from leading a 
political life as economically independent individuals, off ers us a path toward real emanci-
pation in the broadest sense of political agency. In order to reach this emancipative poten-
tial of their work – regardless of one’s own (situated) experiences – one needs to critically 
elucidate how privileged experiences can make a successful woman negate a feminist posi-
tion rather than embracing feminist solidarity. To do so, one needs to engage feminist cri-
tical contributions that expose privilege (Hemmings) and disempowering descriptions by 
39 Hemmings, 147.
40 Alan Bennett, Th e Uncommon Reader (Profi le Books Ltd, 2008), 54.
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the west of non-western women,41 as the process of subjectifi cation of women risks being 
distorted by disempowering descriptions of social categories. By defi nition, these catego-
ries may generate ‘schizophrenic’ feelings of self in the private realm. Politicized in the pre-
sence of others, women as ‘othered’ persist in activities that reject, challenge or re-claim 
identities in the public. 
From such explorations, we fi nd the public a scene for constant negotiations: agonistic 
politics in Honig’s reading of Arendt, or a space where dissonance in Hemming’s argument 
may spur acts of feminist solidarity. Personal experiences that are re-shaped in public may 
hence disrupt dominant discourses, but how words are received is dependent on the rela-
tional web that acknowledges action in terms of political signifi cance.
41 Adami, “Counter Narratives as Political Contestation: Universality, Particularity and Uniqueness,” Th e Equal Rights 
Review 15 (2015): 13- 24; Th e Latina Feminist Group, Telling to Live: Latina Feminist Testimonios (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001).
